China slow to silence roaring tiger of inflation

Wang Qishan, Chinese vice-premier, this week became the latest senior official to identify the fight against inflation as his government’s most important task this year.

“The most pressing problem we face right now is the problem of inflation,” Mr Wang said in an interview on The Charlie Rose Show in the US on Monday. “In order to do this, we have to use monetary policy, fiscal policy and at the same time economic restructuring,” he said.

Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, used a more colourful turn of phrase recently when he described inflation as a tiger that, once freed from its cage, is nearly impossible to put back.

But the policy measures taken by Beijing in its fight against inflation do not reflect the kind of life and death struggle suggested by comments from the country’s leaders.

For one thing, Beijing is encouraging double-digit wage increases — of up to 40 per cent a year in some places — as a way of reducing the country’s wealth gap and shifting the country away from over-reliance on cheap, labour-intensive manufacturing industries.

The government has also allowed several increases in tightly regulated energy prices in recent months, which feed directly into higher prices of most other consumer items.

According to official data released on Wednesday, annual consumer inflation in April was 5.3 per cent, moderating only slightly from a nearly three-year high of 5.4 per cent in March. Both figures were higher than many analysts had expected and indicated that government efforts to rein in surging prices have not yet had a major impact.

There are a number of reasons why Beijing’s actions are a lot less forceful than the rhetoric of senior officials would suggest.

Firstly, analysts say there is no real consensus over the actual causes of inflation among the various government departments responsible for economic policymaking.

For example, the central bank and banking regulator argue inflation is a direct result of the huge liquidity overhang created by the credit-fuelled, post-financial crisis stimulus package, which has been described by some economists as the greatest ever financial and monetary easing in history.

Other government agencies, such as the powerful National Development and Reform Commission, argue inflation is a result of transport and infrastructure bottlenecks as well as profiteering and price manipulation. Until recently, many Chinese officials also blamed loose monetary policy in the US and elsewhere and argued inflation was mostly being imported.

With no clear consensus on the causes or the severity of the problem, China’s leaders are trying a wide range of policy initiatives without fully committing themselves to any of them.

While Beijing is reducing the availability of credit in the economy, mostly through direct orders to Chinese banks to slow lending, the government is wary of damping growth too much, as many believe it did in the early part of 2008, when inflation spiked above 8 per cent.

“In hindsight Chinese policymakers overtightened in 2008 just before the world fell apart,” said Stephen Green, chief China economist at Standard Chartered. “They are clearly tightening monetary policy, but overall growth is already slowing and there is a lot of tension between those arguing now is not the time to overdo things and those who want to act more aggressively to tackle inflation.”

Since last October, the central bank has raised interest rates four times and increased the proportion of deposits banks must hold in reserve eight times.

But the average weighted annual lending rate offered by Chinese banks at the end of March was 6.91 per cent, well below 8.72 per cent at the end of March 2008, according to Standard Chartered figures, indicating that monetary conditions are still much looser than during the last serious bout of inflation.

At that time, in late 2007 and early 2008, Beijing introduced strict direct price controls on a wide range of products but now the government is relying more on moral suasion and scare tactics to deter price rises of key consumer items.

Last Friday, the NDRC fined Unilever RMB2m ($308,000) for suggesting to Chinese media that it might raise detergent and soap prices, saying the Anglo-Dutch consumer goods giant had “intensified inflationary expectations among consumers” and “seriously disturbed market order.”

Analysts describe the fine as an example of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey”, and believe the government is more likely to use such public shock tactics than direct price controls, especially considering growing evidence the economy is starting to slow.

“China is entering an awkward phase now where inflation will stay higher than 5 per cent in the coming months but growth will continue to decelerate,” Mr Green said. “The question is how fast the deceleration will be.”

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/05/11/china.inflation.tiger.ft/index.html

China buys up the world

IN THEORY, the ownership of a business in a capitalist economy is irrelevant. In practice, it is often controversial. From Japanese firms’ wave of purchases in America in the 1980s and Vodafone’s takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann in 2000 to the more recent antics of private-equity firms, acquisitions have often prompted bouts of national angst.

Such concerns are likely to intensify over the next few years, for China’s state-owned firms are on a shopping spree. Chinese buyers—mostly opaque, often run by the Communist Party and sometimes driven by politics as well as profit—have accounted for a tenth of cross-border deals by value this year, bidding for everything from American gas and Brazilian electricity grids to a Swedish car company, Volvo.

There is, understandably, rising opposition to this trend. The notion that capitalists should allow communists to buy their companies is, some argue, taking economic liberalism to an absurd extreme. But that is just what they should do, for the spread of Chinese capital should bring benefits to its recipients, and the world as a whole.

Why China is different

Not so long ago, government-controlled companies were regarded as half-formed creatures destined for full privatisation. But a combination of factors—huge savings in the emerging world, oil wealth and a loss of confidence in the free-market model—has led to a resurgence of state capitalism. About a fifth of global stockmarket value now sits in such firms, more than twice the level ten years ago.

The rich world has tolerated the rise of mercantilist economies before: think of South Korea’s state-led development or Singapore’s state-controlled firms, which are active acquirers abroad. Yet China is different. It is already the world’s second-biggest economy, and in time is likely to overtake America. Its firms are giants that until now have been inward-looking but are starting to use their vast resources abroad.

Chinese firms own just 6% of global investment in international business. Historically, top dogs have had a far bigger share than that. Both Britain and America peaked with a share of about 50%, in 1914 and 1967 respectively. China’s natural rise could be turbocharged by its vast pool of savings. Today this is largely invested in rich countries’ government bonds; tomorrow it could be used to buy companies and protect China against rich countries’ devaluations and possible defaults.

Chinese firms are going global for the usual reasons: to acquire raw materials, get technical know-how and gain access to foreign markets. But they are under the guidance of a state that many countries consider a strategic competitor, not an ally. As our briefing explains (see article), it often appoints executives, directs deals and finances them through state banks. Once bought, natural-resource firms can become captive suppliers of the Middle Kingdom. Some believe China Inc can be more sinister than that: for example, America thinks that Chinese telecoms-equipment firms pose a threat to its national security.

Private companies have played a big part in delivering the benefits of globalisation. They span the planet, allocating resources as they see fit and competing to win customers. The idea that an opaque government might come to dominate global capitalism is unappealing. Resources would be allocated by officials, not the market. Politics, not profit, might drive decisions. Such concerns are being voiced with increasing fervour. Australia and Canada, once open markets for takeovers, are creating hurdles for China’s state-backed firms, particularly in natural resources, and it is easy to see other countries becoming less welcoming too.

That would be a mistake. China is miles away from posing this kind of threat: most of its firms are only just finding their feet abroad. Even in natural resources, where it has been most active in dealmaking, it is not close to controlling enough supply to rig the market for most commodities.

Nor is China’s system as monolithic as foreigners often assume. State companies compete at home and their decision-making is consensual rather than dictatorial. When abroad they may have mixed motives, and some sectors—defence and strategic infrastructure, for instance—are too sensitive to allow them in. But such areas are relatively few.

What if Chinese state-owned companies run their acquisitions for politics, not profit? So long as other firms could satisfy consumers’ needs, it would not matter. Chinese companies could safely be allowed to own energy firms, for instance, in a competitive market where customers could turn to other suppliers. And if Chinese firms throw subsidised capital around the world, that’s fine. America and Europe could use the money. The danger that cheap Chinese capital might undermine rivals can be better dealt with by beefing up competition law than by keeping investment out.

Not all Chinese companies are state-directed. Some are largely independent and mainly interested in profits. Often these firms are making the running abroad. Take Volvo’s new owner, Geely. Volvo should now be able to sell more cars in China; without the deal its future was bleak.

Show a little confidence

Chinese firms can bring new energy and capital to flagging companies around the world; but influence will not just flow one way. To succeed abroad, Chinese companies will have to adapt. That means hiring local managers, investing in local research and placating local concerns—for example by listing subsidiaries locally. Indian and Brazilian firms have an advantage abroad thanks to their private-sector DNA and more open cultures. That has not been lost on Chinese managers.

China’s advance may bring benefits beyond the narrowly commercial. As it invests in the global economy, so its interests will become increasingly aligned with the rest of the world’s; and as that happens its enthusiasm for international co-operation may grow. To reject China’s advances would thus be a disservice to future generations, as well as a deeply pessimistic statement about capitalism’s confidence in itself.

 

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/17463473

 

 

Why should you care about currency wars?

Leaders from the G20 major economies are heading for the South Korean capital Seoul for their fifth summit. But have they run out of steam?

They certainly have some important and difficult issues to tackle. Arguments about currencies and the related question of international trade imbalances have generated a lot of heated debate in the run-up to the summit. And they will be difficult to resolve.

The central issue in what has been called a currency war is currencies either being driven down or prevented from rising to maintain or improve a country’s competitiveness.

The US has a central role on both sides of the argument as accused and accuser.

The US Federal Reserve has been widely blamed for driving the dollar down with policies that force down interest rates and increase the US money supply.

The effect has been to encourage investors to seek better returns outside the US, and by selling dollars to buy foreign assets, they lower the value of the US currency.

US proposal

At the same time, the US have kept up the long standing criticism of China for maintaining its Yuan at a level that they, American officials, think is artificially low and unfairly competitive.

Ahead of the summit, the US came up with a concrete proposal – quantitative limits for current account imbalances – the current account being made up of trade in goods and services plus some financial flows.

To achieve that, China would have to allow its currency to rise, exactly as the US wants.

But there is little chance of that being accepted at the summit.

There is too much opposition, from China and others too.

That is not to say this summit will not achieve anything.

There will almost certainly be an official endorsement of new rules for banks, already agreed by regulators, to make them better able to withstand storms.

It is another, and controversial, matter whether the new rules are up to that task.

Earlier action

Nonetheless, there is a view that the G20 summits have lost momentum.

Certainly, in the early stages – the first summit was in Washington in November 2008 – the gravity of the global economic situation helped to focus minds. It was still pretty scary by the time of the second one, in London’s Docklands in April last year.

Language such as “on the brink”, “the abyss”, “another depression” was widely used at the time, and some big decisions were taken quickly.

They agreed to triple the resources available to the International Monetary Fund for rescue loans.

There was also more or less coordinated economic stimulus from government spending and tax cuts.

Whether that works is controversial, but many economists think it helped prevent things turning out even worse.

Morris Goldstein of the Peterson Institute of International Economics in Washington says that without G20 coordination there would probably have been less stimulus.

He says that if a country acts alone, some of the extra spending “leaks out in terms of imports”.

He argues that G20 cooperation also helped make the effort to fix the banks more effective.

Overall, “in terms of crisis management, I give them pretty high marks”, Dr Goldstein says.

More recently, he says, the record has been much more modest.

Alistair Darling, the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer also says that momentum of the early summits has gone, though it has to be said those early summits were the ones he was involved in.

Still, it does seem that, now the global economy has stepped back from the brink, progress is slower, and world leaders in less of a hurry to do deals.

Given the uneven nature of the recovery, and the tensions in the currency markets, it would be too much to say we are back to business as usual.

But it is certainly a lot less unusual than it was when the G20 summits got started.

 

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11725352

 

 

 

India Hunts For Oil

When Ranbir Singh Butola took over as the managing director of ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) in 2004, the overseas subsidiary of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), his brief was to expand India’s oil and gas footprint. Not surprising then that Butola has spent the last six years living out of a suitcase, logging countless air miles and crisscrossing as many as four continents in less than a fortnight. Butola’s shopping bill adds up to a whopping Rs 54,000 crore, but he isn’t done yet. According to Petroleum Minister Murli Deora, India’s oil PSUs, led by OVL, have invested nearly $12 billion in acquiring overseas assets, taking the country’s share of oil and gas production from these assets to 8.8 million tonnes in 2009-10.

The rush for oil assets is understandable. Already, the nation’s oil import bill has grown six-fold in the past decade to $85.47 billion, equivalent to almost 7 per cent of the country’s GDP. As the Indian economy continues to expand, oil imports are expected to account for 90 per cent of the country’s requirement by 2030, up from 70 per cent at present. As India’s economic growth depends on a steady supply of oil and gas, it’s imperative for the country to secure oil assets overseas. Explains Deora: “Acquisition of exploration and oil producing properties overseas is a key strategy to enhance oil reserves in the country and reduce our dependence on world’s oil reserves.”

The Planning Commission has earmarked an investment of Rs 45,000 crore in the 11th Plan for the acquisition of oil and gas assets. According to Butola, this entitles him to Rs 9,000 crore annually; however, a lot also would depend on the opportunity and India’s ability to leverage it. Led by Butola, OVL carried out India’s biggest energy acquisition-the London Stock Exchange-listed Imperial Energy for an estimated cost of $1.4 billion. The acquisition, says Butola, will give OVL access to around 80,000 barrels per day by the end of 2011, from the current 7,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil. “Imperial has in place reserves of about 3.4 billion barrels of oil equivalent and this takeover would enhance ONGC’s reserves by around 20 per cent,” says the OVL chief.

”Acquisition of exploration and oil producing properties overseas is a key strategy to reduce our dependence on world’s oil reserves” – Murli Deora, Petroleum Minister

Butola, however, agrees that India has made a late entry. “All the national big players in various countries have taken the good acreages in the oil rich regions of the world.” According to Vivek Pandit, director, energy, at FICCI, China has tactfully used its offer of technological assistance and infrastructure-building capability to strengthen its presenc

e in Africa. “Their plan was simple. Give us oil and we wi

ll build your roads, highways, refineries and power projects. The value proposition clicked,” says Pandit. So while China was grabbing the best assets in Africa, OVL’s role remained limited in those crucial years to delivering a few services, with no power to buy property in foreign shores. The power to acquire came only in 1977, with the Navratna tag, but by then India had lost the edge and over the years, China has outpaced India i

n the global quest for energy resources. Armed with a $300-billion sovereign fund, Chinese companies spent a record $32 billion on oil, coal and metals assets abroad. The result: India lost vital deals to the dragon as in the case of a Canadian company with oil fields in central Asia preferring a $4.2-billion takeover bid by China National Petroleum Corp to a

$3.6-billion offer by OVL.

The Government, of course, is quick to explain these losses as a matter of fixing priorities. “We are making efforts to diversify our basket of crude oil imports,” says Sunil Jain, joint secretary (international cooperation), Ministry of Petroleum. “It is not that we lack a strategy or foresight. Each country has its own priorities. Our priority is to ensure that India gets sufficient crude to run its refineries.”

Source: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/114809/FROM%20THE%20MAGAZINE/india-hunts-for-oil.html